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Supplemental Materials for the 
Costly Punishment across Human Societies 
Methods 
In this first section we detail our experimental procedures and protocols, and then 
describe the collection of some of our key economic variables, which are used in the 
regression analyses. 
Experimental Procedures 
Our standardized protocol and script tried to ensure uniformity across sites in a 
number of important dimensions. First, to encourage motivation and attention, we 
standardized the stake at one-day’s wage in the local economy (except in the U.S., where 
$100 was used in urban Missouri to take account of the vastly higher cost of living in 
comparison with rural Missouri, where stakes were set at $50, consistent with minimum 
wage; $40 stakes were used with Emory students). Second, using the method of back 
translation, all of our game scripts were administered in the local language by fluent 
speakers. Third, our protocol design restricted those waiting to play from talking about 
the game and from interacting with players who have just played during a game session. 
Fourth, we individually instructed each participant using fixed (1) scripts (2) sets of 
examples, and (3) pre-play test questions. This guaranteed that all players faced the same 
presentation of the experiments and that they understood the game well enough to 
correctly answer two consecutive test scenarios.  
Typically, the administration of the game went as follows: A randomly selected 
group of adults were invited, usually on the morning of the game or the night before, to 
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the location of the experiment (often at a house or village school). Players were told 
nothing about the experiments before coming, except that (1) their participation was 
completely optional, (2) they would have an opportunity to obtain some money, and (3) 
the whole process would take several hours. Once all players had arrived, the game area 
was secured by the experimental team from the eyes and ears of non-players, a show-up 
fee was paid (20% of the stake/one-day’s wage) and participants selected (randomly from 
a hat) to determine their order of play. The game script was then read to the whole group. 
The script included the following points (1) participation is purely optional and people 
should feel free to leave at any time, (2) people’s decisions are entirely private, except to 
the lead experimenter who will not tell anyone (because most of our researchers were 
long-term field workers in these locales, players’ trust of the experimenters was 
extremely high), (3) all games will be played only once, (4) players must not discuss the 
game (research assistants monitored the group for compliance) and (5) all the money is 
real and people will receive payments to take home at the end of the session. The 
description of the experimental situation and decision situation was followed by a fixed 
set of examples, which were illustrated to the group by manipulating bills or coins in the 
local currency. 
After the instructions were read to the group, individual players were brought 
one-by-one into a separate area, where the game instructions were re-read and more 
examples were given. Again, examples were illustrated by manipulating cash on a 
masking tape layout (see image below). If the player confirmed that he or she understood 
the game and the experimenter agreed, they were given test questions that required them 
to state the amount of money that each player would receive under various hypothetical 
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circumstances. Players had to correctly answer two consecutive test situations to pass, 
and be allowed to participate in the experiment (this actually requires four correct 
amounts to be stated for the DG and UG, and 6 correct amounts for the 3PPG). If a player 
could not do the required mathematics, they were permitted to manipulate the money 
according to the hypothetical examples, and then count the money in each pile to answer 
(thus, everyone had to have the ability to count to 10). After passing this test, players 
were told their role in the actual game (e.g., Player 2) and were asked to make the 
required decision(s). If a research assistant was present, he or she had to turn away and 
would not observe the actual decisions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Third Party Punishment Game in the village of Teci, on Yasawa Island, Fiji (Photo by 
Robert Boyd). 
 
As in most behavioural experiments, all participants knew everything about the 
experimental game, except who was matched with whom. Our script specified that 
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players were matched with another person (or two people in the Third Party Punishment 
Game) from this village (or other relevant local grouping), but made clear that no one 
would know who was matched with whom. The script also made clear that the game 
would be played only once. 
In our DG-UG protocol, players first played the Dictator Game through to 
completion and then immediately played the Ultimatum Game. Player 1s in the DG kept 
their role in the UG. The inert Player 2 in the DG, before finding out what they received 
in the DG, assumed the role of Player 2 in the UG. Players in the 3PPG were a fresh 
sample that had not participated in the prior two games—the 3PPG was usually done 
weeks later, and in the case of the Tsimane and Au, the 3PPG research was done in a 
different village from the DG and UG. Here, we largely avoid concerns of the effects of 
experience in game play by focusing on DG offers (the DG always came first), Player 2 
in the UG (who was inert in the DG, and did not learn about how much money he got in 
the DG until after his UG decision), and Player 3 in the 3PPG, who were also usually first 
timers.  
1762 individuals participated in the games we use in this paper (there were 
additional contextualized experiments that we do not present here). 962 individuals 
played only one of the three games. 652 played the DG and UG (in the same role--player 
1 or player 2), but did not play the 3PPG. One (1) individual was player 2 in the DG but 
player 1 in the UG. 147 individuals played all three games. 91 individuals played all three 
games in the same role (player 1 or player 2). 17 (15) individuals played as player 2 
(player 3) in the 3PPG, but were player 1 in the DG and UG. 9 (14) individuals played as 
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player 1 (player 3) in the 3PPG, but were player 2 in the DG and UG. One (1) individual 
was player 1 in the DG, player 2 in the UG, and player 3 in the 3PPG. 
All of the instructions, game scripts, data collection tools, and protocols are 
available at our project website: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/roots-of-sociality/phase-
ii/docs. We encourage others to use these protocols and contribute to the database. 
Collection of Economic and Demographic Data 
At each site we collected 25 different economic and demographic variables using 
standardized collection protocols and forms. Relevant to our analysis here we will briefly 
discuss our measures of income, wealth and household size. Income is an individual 
measure (unlike wealth and household size) and represents any flow of revenue available 
to the individual from legal, illegal, formal, and informal sources. Given the likely flux in 
seasonal income in many places, we measured this in an extensive interview for the 
previous year (see project website for interview protocol). Wealth is a measure of total 
productive assets owned by a household. These are revenue generating, or potentially 
revenue generating, assets, e.g.: farm acreage, livestock, farm equipment (plows, 
threshers), boats, commercial transport (trucks, ox and horse carts), firearms, etc. A 
household is defined as a group of people who share in the household estate—that is, a 
corporate body who may or may not live together (including absent school children, for 
example), but who share some household accounts and whose members are subject to 
some decision-making authority by the head/s of household. We used the standard 
ethnographic techniques of (1) cross-checking informant reports by asking multiple 
informants the same questions (e.g., independently asking fathers and sons at different 
times about wealth), and (2) checking free responses (which could be influenced by recall 
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ability) by also listing possible sources of income or wealth from a master list gleaned 
from a combination of past interviews and observation. 
Table S1 provides the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression 
analyses to follow. 
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Table S1. Summary Statistics for Demographic and Economic variables used below 
Population 
Sex 
1 = all 
female 
Education 
(years) 
Household 
Size 
Income 
(USD) 
Household 
Wealth 
(USD) 
MAO 
UG 
MXAO 
UG 
MAO 
3PPG 
Accra 
0.26 
(0.44) 
10.15 
(3.35) 
2.60 
(2.09) 
529.3 
(543.7) 
Index 
13.00 
(17.25) 
87.93 
(17.19) 
26.15 
(18.01) 
Shuar 
0.41 
(0.50) 
6.21 
(3.72) 
6.10 
(2.23) 
737.3 
(955.8) 
6086.67 
(5873.63) 
6.50 
(13.87) 
97.50 
(11.18) 
19.33 
(22.19) 
Sursurunga 
0.50 
(0.50) 
6.63 
(2.96) 
5.53 
(2.28) 
276.5 
(477.5) 
5023.75 
(5665.90) 
24.35 
(20.41) 
83.68 
(23.62) 
10.31 
(13.32) 
Sanquianga 
0.57 
(0.50) 
4.05 
(3.14) 
6.68 
(2.93) 
1894.7 
(2321.8) 
2234.98 
(4383.50) 
12.33 
(18.13) 
88.33 
(16.21) 
23.87 
(21.55) 
Rural 
Missouri 
0.59 
(0.50) 
13.71 
(2.13) 
2.94 
(1.22) 
24085.4 
(18792.7) 
115,756 
(180,875) 
27.86 
(19.50) 
NA NA 
Urban 
Missouri 
0.54 
(0.51) 
15.17 
(1.95) 
3.00 
(0.00) 
37083.3 
(10417.0) 
63,9357 
(58,077) 
NA NA NA 
Tsimane 
0.53 
(0.50) 
3.60 
(3.58) 
7.70 
(4.00) 
127.5 
(207.3) 
453.85 
(290.77) 
6.67 
(5.40) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
3.91 
(7.83) 
Maragoli 
0.46 
(0.50) 
12.54 
(1.20) 
7.16 
(1.75) 
1192.5 
(493.5) 
1951.29 
(373.39) 
30.00 
(7.64) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
33.04 
(16.63) 
Yasawa 
0.51 
(0.50) 
8.39 
(2.27) 
6.93 
(3.24) 
1158.7 
(1111.7) 
423.87 
(510.01) 
6.47 
(13.46) 
94.85 
(13.26) 
5.00 
(9.23) 
Samburu 
0.56 
(0.50) 
1.38 
(2.85) 
8.73 
(4.78) 
359.1 
(385.8) 
2462.90 
(3113.03) 
6.13 
(12.30) 
97.10 
(5.29) 
18.93 
(10.66) 
Hadza 
0.43 
(0.50) 
1.24 
(2.01) 
3.42 
(2.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
16.54 
(17.42) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
5.65 
(13.76) 
Isanga 
0.53 
(0.50) 
7.57 
(2.27) 
5.86 
(2.11) 
203.9 
(309.7) 
152.71 
(173.89) 
7.33 
(10.15) 
98.33 
(9.13) 
31.00 
(15.86) 
Au 
0.17 
(0.38) 
3.28 
(3.21) 
5.53 
(2.07) 
41.4 
(142.6) 
89.21 
(52.61) 
20.00 
(21.01) 
92.67 
(13.63) 
30.67 
(19.99) 
Emory 
0.53 
(0.50) 
13.00 
(0.00) 
 
13859.2 
(79199.2) 
NA 
20.53 
(14.33) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
16.00 
(19.84) 
Gusii 
0.47 
(0.50) 
11.86 
(2.55) 
7.16 
(1.75) 
1520.1 
(675.9) 
6008.03 
(1357.68) 
38.00 
(5.77) 
100 
(0) 
41 
(5.48) 
Dolgan 
0.63 
(0.49) 
10.10 
(1.74) 
4.66 
(2.06) 
1313.8 
(1079.1) 
Index 
14.74 
(20.38) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
NA 
Nganasan 
0.43 
(0.50) 
9.04 
(2.85) 
4.71 
(2.21) 
1191.8 
(1491.1) 
Index 
15.00 
(19.58) 
95.00 
(15.81) 
NA 
 Table S1. MAO-UG is the average minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum 
Game. MXAO-UG is the maximum acceptable offer. MAO-TPP is the minimum 
acceptable offer in the Third Party Punishment Game.
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While we did obtain income and household size measures for all societies, we 
were able to generate only a ‘wealth index’ for the Dolgan/Nganasan in Siberia and wage 
workers of Accra, Ghana. This wealth index permits within-group analyses of wealth 
effects, but is not comparable with our wealth measurements from other groups, so these 
populations must be dropped from some of our analyses of wealth effects. Also, note that 
in the Third Party Punishment Game we did not obtain income or wealth data for the 
Tsimane'.  
The student data from Emory is not used in any of our regression analyses below. 
Since it has been established that university students have not yet reached their adult-
developmental plateau in these game measures (S1-S3), our adult (non-student) data from 
Missouri is the appropriate comparative dataset. Frey and Meier’s analysis of a large 
natural experiment (S5) shows a similar age effect as the experimental approaches: 
controlling for other factors, older individuals are more pro-social than younger 
individuals. Introducing student data would potentially confound developmental variation 
with other sources of between-population variation, such as those arising from cultural or 
economic differences. 
Additional methodological concerns 
Readers will also have additional concerns about anonymity, how participants 
interpreted the experiments, and the specific contexts of each field site. The matter of 
anonymity and its interpretation in these experiments is already much discussed. 
Recently, several of us wrote about it at length in (S6), which details the previous round 
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of experimental games. Many of those concerns stay with this study, so we refer the 
reader to that article and the citations within it.  
For our previous round of experiments, we ultimately published an edited volume 
(S7) containing descriptions of each field site, methodological variations at each site, and 
individual researcher interpretations of differences among groups. We have already 
drafted chapters along this same plan for the new data and sites presented here, so we ask 
the reader curious about additional ethnographic details to wait for the book, as only a 
book will adequately address those details. 
Supporting Analyses 
In this section we present a series of supporting regression analyses that show (1) 
a substantial portion of variation among our population in their willingness to punish in 
both the Ultimatum Game and the Third Party Punishment cannot be explained by the 
main effects of measured economic and demographic differences and (2) “hyperfair 
rejections” (rejections of offers greater than 50%) in the UG likely do not result from 
confusion about the game. Along the way, we will highlight and discuss any economic or 
demographic variables that emerge and contribute to explaining the variation in 
punishment. In particular, we observe that population—not individual—differences in 
education (mean number of years of formal education) predict more willingness to 
punish. For rhetorical purposes, we will first focus on the UG data and then on the 3PPG 
data. 
Ultimatum Game 
For the Ultimatum Game (UG), our regression analyses examine the predictive 
capacity of six demographic and economic variables on individuals’ willingness to reject 
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both low and high offers. These analyses confirm that the observed variation between 
populations cannot be primarily explained by economic and demographic differences 
among our samples. We also assess the possibility that rejections of offers greater than 
50% result from some form of confusion about the game by regressing the number of 
rejections each player made for offers above 50% on their education and the number of 
examples that were required for the individual to pass our test. This “confusion 
hypothesis” finds no support.     
Minimum Acceptable Offers (MAO) in the UG 
To explore the variation in people’s willingness to punish low offers we used each 
Player 2’s vector of accept/reject decisions to calculate their minimum acceptable offer 
(MAO). MAO is the lowest offer—between zero and 50%—that a person will accept. For 
example, if a player stated they would reject an offer of zero, but then accepted 10 
through 50, their MAO is set at 10. If an individual accepted all offers up to and 
including 50%, their MAO was set at 0. If they rejected offers of 0% through 40% but 
accepted 50%, their MAO is 50. Under this restrictive scheme it is quite possible for 
people to produce sets of decisions that do not yield an MAO (e.g., reject 0, accept 10, 
reject 20…), 96% (434 out of 452) of Player 2s provided decision vectors that readily 
translated to MAOs—and the missing 18 are spread fairly evenly across our populations. 
Of these 18 deviant players, 11 were people who rejected everything between 0 and 50 
(inclusive).  
To study the effects of our economic and demographic measures on MAO, we 
followed a three step procedure. First, we regressed our MAO variable on the population 
dummy variables in order to establish the amount of variation among population means 
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(the data from rural Missouri were used as the point of comparison for the other groups). 
This analysis shows that about 34.4% of variation in MAO arises from differences 
between population means. In step two we added our measures of sex, birth year (age), 
education, household size, income (U.S. dollars), and wealth (U.S. dollars) to see what 
fraction of the variation in MAO within populations can be captured by these variables. 
Table S2A shows that adding these variables explains an additional 7% of variation, 
bringing the total variance explained to 41.5%. Finally, we remove the population 
dummies in order to see how much of the total variation can be explained by our 
variables, both within and between populations. This explains about 15.8% of the 
variance (Table S2B), and indicates that a substantial portion of the between population 
variance is unaccounted for by our economic and demographic predictors.  
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Table S2A. MAO-UG Regression R2 = 0.415 R2(adj) = 0.380 
N = 302        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 94.995 123.086 0.000 0.441 
Shuar -25.959 6.030 -0.354 0.000 
Sursurunga -8.182 6.055 -0.122 0.178 
Sanquianga -19.726 5.990 -0.331 0.001 
Tsimane -24.816 6.629 -0.397 0.000 
Maragoli -6.457 5.576 -0.100 0.248 
Fiji -27.497 5.342 -0.488 0.000 
Samburu -24.851 6.660 -0.417 0.000 
Hadza -13.963 6.627 -0.220 0.036 
Isanga village -26.299 5.600 -0.441 0.000 
Au 6.935 8.100 0.054 0.393 
Gussi 1.974 5.452 0.031 0.718 
Birth Year -0.033 0.063 -0.027 0.597 
Sex (Female = 1) 0.756 1.764 0.021 0.668 
Education (years) 0.476 0.341 0.130 0.163 
Household Size 0.107 0.271 0.022 0.692 
Income (USD) -0.00032 0.00021 -0.124 0.125 
Wealth (USD) -0.000014 0.00015 -0.050 0.355 
  
 
Table S2B. MAO-UG Regression R2 = 0.158 R2(adj) = 0.14 
N = 302        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 250.295 136.588 0.000 0.068 
Birth Year -0.123 0.069 -0.098 0.078 
Sex (Female = 1) -1.879 1.936 -0.053 0.332 
Education (years) 1.401 0.212 0.381 0.000 
Household Size -0.125 0.269 -0.026 0.642 
Income (USD) -0.000 0.000 -0.031 0.662 
Wealth (USD) -0.000 0.000 -0.033 0.598 
 
 
Focusing first on Table S2B, we observe that the only potentially important 
predictors of MAO in the UG are education and birth year. An additional decade of 
formal schooling increases an individual’s MAO by 14, while a decade in age increases 
MAO by 1.2. However, once the population dummy variables are introduced, neither 
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birth year nor education emerges as a powerful predictor. Thus, these appear to be largely 
between-group effects. Perhaps mean education is correlated with some other variable not 
in the regression that varies between, but not within, populations.   
In order to run the above regression analysis we had to drop the data from Accra 
(Ghana) and from the Dolgan/Nganasan (Siberia) because we only obtained a wealth 
index (suitable only for within population analysis), and not wealth measures equivalent 
to what we obtained elsewhere. To address this, we re-ran the above three step analysis 
dropping our wealth variable and including Accra and the Dolgan/Nganasan. The 
population dummies capture 29.2% of the variation—Missouri is again the point of 
reference. Adding the economic and demographic variables (not including wealth) 
increases the variation explained to about 35% (Table S3A). Dropping the population 
dummies shows that the economic and demographic variables alone explain 11% (Table 
S3B), and leave much of the variation between populations unexplained. 
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Table S3A. MAO-UG Regression (without wealth) R2 = 0.346 R2(adj) = 0.312 
N = 365        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 41.778 121.298 0.000 0.731 
Accra -22.370 5.514 -0.344 0.000 
Shuar -27.376 6.227 -0.341 0.000 
Sursurunga -9.746 6.238 -0.133 0.119 
Sanquianga -20.661 6.158 -0.318 0.001 
Tsimane -25.943 6.657 -0.411 0.000 
Maragoli -6.332 5.830 -0.090 0.278 
Fiji -28.026 5.568 -0.456 0.000 
Samburu -26.236 6.770 -0.404 0.000 
Hadza -16.178 6.726 -0.233 0.017 
Isanga village -27.139 5.821 -0.418 0.000 
Au 4.675 8.359 0.033 0.576 
Gusii 2.133 5.703 0.030 0.709 
Ngsn-Dolgan -20.434 5.478 -0.305 0.000 
Birth Year -0.005 0.062 -0.004 0.939 
Sex (Female = 1) -0.378 1.655 -0.011 0.819 
Education (years) 0.345 0.329 0.091 0.295 
Household Size 0.003 0.273 0.001 0.992 
Income (USD) -0.0004 0.0002 -0.141 0.048 
 
 
 
Table S3B. MAO-UG Regression (without wealth) R2 = 0.11 R2(adj) = 0.097 
N = 365        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant  197.821  131.671 0.000  0.134 
Birth Year  -0.096  0.067 -0.074  0.151 
Sex (Female = 1)  -2.807  1.790 -0.079  0.118 
Education (years)  1.166  0.201 0.308  0.000 
Household Size  0.047  0.253 0.009  0.854 
Income (USD)  -0.000006  0.00015 -0.002  0.971 
 
 
Again, focusing on Table S3B first, we observed that education remains an 
important predictor, while birth year, which was marginal at best above, has further 
weakened. A decade of education predicts an increase in an individuals MAO of 12. 
Once the population dummies have been entered in the regression (Table S3A), the effect 
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of education again drops (indicating a between-population difference) while income 
moves into the marginal range, with an additional $10,000 of income creating a drop in 
MAO of 4. Additional Analysis suggests that this income effect is driven by the joint 
presence of Missouri and the Au. If the Au are dropped, the income coefficient 
essentially flips its sign. If Missouri is dropped, the effect vanishes. 
Maximum Acceptable Offer in the UG 
Using the same approach described above for the MAO, we calculated the 
maximum acceptable offer (MXAO), which is the highest offer above 50% that a Player 
will accept. If a player accepted all offers above 50%, his MXOA was set at 100. If he 
accepted 50, 60, 70, and 80, but rejected 90 and 100%, his MXAO was set at 80%. As 
explained above for MAO, it is quite possible for individuals to produce decision strategy 
vectors that do not fit the assumptions of our procedure. However, we were able to assign 
MXAOs to 96% of players. Unlike the assignment of MAO, only 2 of the 20 individuals 
who were unassignable to an MXAO rejected all offer amounts from 50 to 100% 
(inclusive). Ten of these unassignable players came from the Sursurunga of New Ireland, 
and five from the Hadza of Tanzania.  
Following the three step analytical procedure above, we first regressed MXAO on 
our population dummies and found them to account for about 17% of the variation. 
Adding age, sex, education, household size, income, and wealth increases the variance 
explained to 24% (Table S4A). Removing the population dummies drops the variance 
explained to 5% (Table S4B), indicating that very little of the between group variance 
can be explained by differences in our economic and demographic variables. Note, here 
Missouri is not included because we did not initially consider the possibility that people 
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would reject offers greater than 50%. Thus, the Shuar are used as a standard for 
comparison for the population dummies variables.1   
Table S4A. MXAO-UG Regression R2 = 0.236 R2(adj) = 0.188 
N = 270        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant -148.845 103.808 0.000 0.153 
Sursurunga -17.270 3.591 -0.374 0.000 
Sanquianga -9.255 3.401 -0.246 0.007 
Tsimane -2.479 3.683 -0.063 0.502 
Maragoli 3.576 3.937 0.088 0.365 
Fiji -3.516 3.442 -0.098 0.308 
Samburu -3.274 3.520 -0.087 0.353 
Hadza -3.434 3.713 -0.086 0.356 
Isanga village -2.256 3.432 -0.060 0.511 
Au -12.089 5.242 -0.151 0.022 
Gusii 7.807 3.869 0.192 0.045 
Birth Year 0.129 0.053 0.146 0.016 
Sex (Female = 1) -2.267 1.450 -0.096 0.119 
Education (years) -0.288 0.268 -0.114 0.283 
Household Size -0.043 0.214 -0.013 0.839 
Income (USD) -0.002 0.001 -0.131 0.093 
Wealth (USD) -0.001 0.000 -0.182 0.008 
 
                                                
1 In Missouri we only asked players for their minimum acceptable offer and did not have them go through 
the entire response vector. Consequently, while it seems very likely that no Missourians would have 
rejected offer greater than 50% (given the data from Emory and elsewhere in the U.S.), we have omitted 
them from the following analysis. Assuming all Missourians have an MXAO of 100 only magnifies the 
above conclusions. 
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Table S4B. MXAO-UG Regression  R2 = 0.05 R2(adj) = 0.032 
N = 270        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 17.108 106.350 0.000 0.872 
Birth Year 0.040 0.054 0.046 0.457 
Sex (Female = 1) -2.168 1.449 -0.092 0.136 
Education (years) 0.278 0.166 0.110 0.095 
Household Size 0.177 0.206 0.054 0.389 
Income (USD) -0.0013 0.0009 -0.096 0.156 
Wealth (USD) -0.0005 0.00018 -0.188 0.004 
 
Focusing on Table S4B, we observe that both wealth and education contribute 
significantly to explaining the variance in MXAO.  For every 1000 additional dollars of 
household wealth, individuals decrease their MXAO by 1 percent. For every decade of 
formal schooling, individuals increase their MXAO by 2.8 percent. When the population 
dummies are added to the regression, the wealth effect holds (keeping the same 
magnitude), birth year becomes significant at conventional levels, income rises to 
marginal significance, and any education effect again largely evaporate (Table S4A). The 
coefficient on income is twice the size of that of Wealth, so an additional $2000 in annual 
income decreases MXAO by 2 percent. An additional decade of life decreases MXAO by 
1.3 percent.  
For the same reasons described above, we ran the above analyses excluding the 
data from Accra and from the Dolgan/Nganasan. Here, for MXAO, we again drop our 
wealth measure and now include both of these populations in the analysis. The Shuar are 
used as the point of reference for the dummy variables. Regressing MXAO on the 
population dummies captures 16.6% of the variation. In Table S5A, adding our 
demographic and economic variables increases the variation explained to 18.5%. Then, in 
Table S5B, dropping the population dummies reduces the variance explained to 0.9%, 
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demonstrating that little or none of the variation between populations is likely to be 
explained by our economic and demographic variables.  
Table S5A. MXAO-UG Regression (without Wealth) R2 = 0.185 R2(adj) = 0.141 
N = 332        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant -62.136 102.746 0.000  0.546 
Accra -9.098 3.578 -0.209  0.011 
Sursurunga -14.852 3.790 -0.280  0.000 
Sanquianga -8.399 3.532 -0.195  0.018 
Tsimane 1.478 3.623 0.035  0.684 
Maragoli 4.925 3.949 0.105  0.213 
Fiji -1.408 3.394 -0.034  0.679 
Samburu -0.801 3.674 -0.019  0.828 
Hadza 0.878 3.793 0.019  0.817 
Isanga village 1.007 3.459 0.023  0.771 
Au -7.553 5.480 -0.082  0.169 
Gusii 5.691 3.974 0.122  0.153 
Ngsan-Dolgan 2.528 3.608 0.057  0.484 
Birth Year 0.083 0.052 0.087  0.116 
Sex (Female = 1) -1.155 1.350 -0.047  0.393 
Education (years) -0.195 0.261 -0.073  0.457 
Household Size -0.105 0.213 -0.031  0.623 
Income (USD) -0.001 0.001 -0.057  0.387 
 
 
Table S5B. MXAO-UG Regression (Without Wealth) R2 = 0.009 R2(adj) = 0.000 
N = 332        
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 63.361 104.941 0.000 0.546 
Birth Year 0.016 0.053 0.017 0.765 
Sex (Female = 1) -1.157 1.366 -0.047 0.397 
Education (years) 0.087 0.160 0.033 0.588 
Household Size 0.227 0.191 0.067 0.236 
Income (USD) -0.001 0.001 -0.062 0.308 
Punishment of “hyperfair offers” does not result from confusion 
Given the non-intuitive nature of hyper-fair rejections, we explored the possibility 
that despite our extensive instruction and rigorous one-on-one testing procedures, those 
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who rejected high offers might have somehow misunderstood the game. For every Player 
2 in the UG we summed up the number of rejections each individual made for offers 
greater than 50% and ran two regressions. First, we regressed this variable on education, 
suspecting that more educated people might better grasp some elements of the game 
missed in our testing procedure. The coefficient, standard error, and p-value for education 
were 0.02, 0.016, and 0.21, respectively. Adding population dummies (and using the 
Shuar as a reference point), to address any between-group variation yields a coefficient, 
standard error, and p-value of 0.04, 0.025 and 0.10 (n = 383), respectively. This increases 
the effect size of education in the direction opposite to that expected by the confusion 
hypothesis—here, more schooling, if it does anything, favors more hyperfair rejections. 
Second, we regressed our hyperfair rejections variable on the ‘number of examples and 
test questions used’, which records essentially how much effort was required in 
explaining the game, as it was conveyed through repeated examples and test questions. 
With dummies entered into the regression to control for any differences in the numbers of 
illustrative examples used by different researchers, the coefficient, standard error and p-
value for this predictor are -0.022, 0.047, and 0.63, respectively. Again, the insignificant 
coefficient here is in the opposite direction to expect by a ‘confusion explanation’: people 
who required more examples and test questions had fewer rejections above 50%.  
Two additional facts support the claim that punishing hyperfair offers is not the 
result of confusion or misunderstanding. First, in the third party punishment game, which 
was generally more difficult to explain and took longer for players to apprehend, people 
did not punish hyperfair offers (main text, Figure 2). A look at the third party punishment 
game explains why: if Player 1 offered the full amount (100%) to Player 2, Player 3 
 20 
cannot punish Player 1 because we did not allow negative payoffs (and he is not 
permitted to take money away from Player 2). Player 3 could pay 10%, but this would not 
take any money away from Player 1. If Player 1 had given 90% to Player 2, Player 3 
could pay 10% to take 10% away from Player 1, but this is very costly punishment. It is 
not until Player 1 gives 70% to Player 2, when things aren’t all that unequal, that Player 3 
can administer the full brunt of his punishment to Player 1. Consequently, punishment 
was not expected for high offers in 3PPG, and very little was seen. However, if 
punishment of hyperfair offers in the UG was the result of confusion, we would expect 
similar confusion in the more difficult 3PPG. Second, post game interviews of players 
who punished high offers in the UG reveal both that people understood the game 
(answered factual questions about the game correctly) and made sensible responses as to 
why they rejected high offers, such as “it was too much, I cannot accept that much.” 
Finally, our findings, that hyper fair rejections are not the product of confusion, are fully 
consistent with prior efforts to analyze similar findings from Tatarstan and Sakha-
Yakutia, Russia (S4).  
Third Party Punishment 
Using the same technique described above for MAO in the UG, we calculated 
minimum acceptable offer (MAO-3PP) for each Player 3 in the Third Party Punishment 
Game. While it is quite possible for players to provide strategy vectors that defy 
assignment by our MAO process, we were able to assign 92% (317 of 346). Ten 
additional players could have been assigned if we would have permitted an MAO of 60 
(94%). The remaining 6% who defy MAO assignment are scattered across all groups 
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(with most groups having between zero and two), although seven such individuals can be 
found among the Maragoli.  
Following the same procedure used above for the UG, we first regressed MAO-
3PP on the population dummies and found that 38.2% of the variation occurs between 
groups (the Shuar were used as the point of reference). Adding our standard set of 
economic and demographic predictors increases the variation accounted for to 41% 
(Table S6A). Removing the population dummies drops the variance explained to 11% 
(Table S6B). Thus, as with second party punishment in the UG, third party punishment 
varies substantially among populations, and most of this variation cannot be accounted 
for by differences in our economic and demographic measures. Note, these regressions do 
not include the Tsimane or Accra, as we lack comparable wealth data from these. Also, 
recall that we do not have 3PPG data from the Dolgan, Nganasan, or Missouri.  
Table S6A. MAO-3PPG Regression  R2 = 0.41 R2(adj) = 0.37 
N = 241         
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 147.049 168.990 0.000 0.385 
Sursurunga -9.604 4.953 -0.170 0.054 
Sanquianga 3.764 5.680 0.066 0.508 
Maragoli 9.588 6.125 0.147 0.119 
Fiji -16.286 5.509 -0.264 0.003 
Samburu -0.450 5.973 -0.007 0.940 
Hadza -11.154 5.897 -0.171 0.060 
Isanga 11.835 5.625 0.171 0.036 
Au 14.924 5.973 0.194 0.013 
Gusii 17.796 5.534 0.307 0.001 
Birth Year -0.067 0.086 -0.048 0.436 
Sex (Female = 1) 0.557 2.260 0.015 0.805 
Education (years) 0.367 0.436 0.089 0.401 
Household Size 0.437 0.416 0.064 0.295 
Income (USD) 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.579 
Wealth (USD) 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.904 
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Table S6B. MAO-3PPG Regression  R2 = 0.10 R2(adj) = 0.08 
N = 241         
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 397.9 181.3 0.000 0.029 
Birth Year -0.197 0.092 -0.141 0.034 
Sex (Female = 1) 0.417 2.514 0.0109 0.868 
Education (years) 1.01 0.269 0.245 0.00022 
Household Size 0.479 0.437 0.070 0.274 
Income (USD) 0.0016 0.00095 0.113 0.0876 
Wealth (USD) -0.00015 0.00028 -0.0359 0.583 
 
Starting with Table S6B, we observed that three of our dependent variables show 
some predictive power. Paralleling the finding from the analysis of MAO-UG, an 
additional decade of formal schooling again predicts an increase in MAO-3PP of 10. An 
additional decade of life predicts an MAO-3PP increase of 2. Income is marginally 
significant, with an additional $1000 of income increasing MAO by 1.6. None of these 
predictions remain significant once the populations dummies are entered (Table S6A), 
suggesting that these variables are picking up between between-group differences. 
To incorporate the Tsimane and Accra data, we dropped both the wealth and 
income variables. Regressing MAO-3PP first on the population dummy variables 
captures 37.9% of the variation. Adding the demographic variables increases the variance 
explained to 40.5% (Table S7A). Dropping the dummies reduces the variance explained 
to 9%. Thus, most of the variation between groups in MAO-3PP remains unexplained. 
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Table S7A. MAO-3PPG Regression (without Wealth or 
Income) 
R2 = 0.405 R2(adj) = 0.37 
N = 305         
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 200.575 143.903 0.000 0.164 
Sursurunga -9.893 4.875 -0.159 0.043 
Sanquianga 4.949 5.036 0.079 0.327 
Maragoli 9.734 5.492 0.135 0.077 
Fiji -15.623 5.028 -0.233 0.002 
Samburu 0.645 5.453 0.010 0.906 
Hadza -12.643 5.466 -0.176 0.021 
Isanga 11.291 5.309 0.147 0.034 
Au 13.942 5.628 0.164 0.014 
Gusii 18.335 5.181 0.287 0.000 
Tsimane -15.842 5.158 -0.220 0.002 
Accra 4.411 4.998 0.077 0.378 
Birth Year -0.093 0.073 -0.066 0.207 
Sex (Female = 1) -0.623 1.873 -0.016 0.740 
Education (years) 0.365 0.320 0.091 0.254 
Household Size 0.017 0.359 0.003 0.963 
 
Table S7B. MAO-3PPG Regression  R2 = 0.09 R2(adj) = 0.078 
N = 305         
Effect Coefficient Std Error Std Coef P(2 Tail) 
Constant 532.877 158.649 0.000 0.001 
Birth Year -0.264 0.081 -0.187 0.001 
Sex (Female = 1) -0.331 2.164 -0.009 0.878 
Education (years) 0.966 0.226 0.241 0.000 
Household Size -0.117 0.364 -0.018 0.747 
 
Focusing on Table S7B, we observe that again education and birth year are 
significant predictors of MAO-3PP. An additional decade of formal schooling predicts an 
increase in MAO-3PP of about 10. An additional decade of life predicts an increase in 
MAO-3PP of 2.6 percent. Once the population controls are entered (Table S7A), none of 
our demographic predictors are significant, again suggesting that these variables are 
picking up between-group differences. 
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Dictator Game Results  
Figure 2 shows the distributions of offers in the Dictator Game, our measure of 
altruism in one-shot anonymous interactions. The horizontal axis gives the possible offers 
as a percentage of the total stake, with the area of the circles at each offer amount 
displaying the proportion of the sample that made that offer. Overall, of our 428 DG 
offers (excluding Emory students), 5.4% (23) were zero, 30.4% (130) were 50/50 splits, 
85.8% occurred between 10% and 50% (inclusive), and only 8.7% were greater then half 
the stake (38 offers, 21 of which were at 60%). Our populations differed in modes, means 
and standard deviations. Mean offers ranged from about 26%, among the Tsimane and 
Hadza, to the high 40’s in Missouri and among the Sanquianga. Modal offers are zero 
among the Hadza, 10% for Tsimane, 30% for Gusii, and 50% for half of the societies 
studied (with some groups showing multiple modes). The standard deviation in offers 
varies across societies from 5.4 among the Gusii farmers in the highlands of Kenya to 24 
among Emory freshmen and 25 among the Hadza—the mean standard deviation is 17.6.   
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Figure 2. The distribution of offers in the Dictator Game.  
Reading horizontally for each of the populations listed along the left vertical axis, the area of each 
bubble represents the fraction of our sample who made that offer, so each horizontal set of 
bubbles provides the complete distribution of offers for each population. The blue slash gives the 
mean offer for each population. The n values on the right side provide the number of pairs. 
 
Relationship between punishment, fairness and altruism 
To explore the possibility that a willingness to administer costly second and third 
party punishment may have culturally coevolved with notions of fairness and altruism, 
Table S8 presents the Pearson correlations between the mean offers for each population 
in each of our three experiments and three statistics measuring (in some fashion) each 
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population’s willingness to administer punishment, for both the UG and 3PPG. These 
three statistics are the mean MAO, the 80th percentile MAO, and the 90th percentile 
MAO. The last two statistics present the offer amounts at which a Player 1 could 
guarantee an eight or ninety (respectively) percent chance of not being punished. We 
have provided these statistics because it remains an unresolved theoretical issue as to 
what measure of a populations’ willingness to punish should drive the emergence of 
fairness and altruism.  
Table S8. Pearson correlations, sample sizes (in parentheses), and 95% confidence 
intervals (in brackets) 
Population Statistics Mean DG Offer Mean UG Offer 
Mean 3PPG 
Offer 
Mean DG Offer 1.0 --- --- 
Mean UG Offer 
0.81 (14) 
[0.46 - 0.88] 
1.0 --- 
Mean 3PPG Offer 
0.64 (12) 
[0.19 - 0.77] 
0.57 (12) 
[0.18 - 0.75] 
1.0 
Mean MAOUG 
0.14 (14) 
[-0.14 - 0.37] 
0.14 (14) 
[-0.07 - 0.33] 
0.33 (12) 
[0.0002 - 0.55] 
80th Percentile MAOUG 
0.39 (14) 
[-0.04 - 0.62] 
0.42 (14) 
[0.07 - 0.63] 
0.41 (12) 
[-0.07 - 0.66] 
90th Percentile MAOUG 
0.33 (14) 
[0.01 - 0.66] 
0.41 (14) 
[0.18 - 0.65] 
0.29 (12) 
[-0.04 - 0.71] 
Mean MAO3PP 
0.37 (12) 
[0.03 - 0.55] 
0.17 (12) 
[-0.04 - 37] 
0.52 (12) 
[0.17 - 0.70] 
80th Percentile MAO3PP 
0.57 (12) 
[0.14 - 0.73] 
0.30 (12) 
[-0.007 - 0.47] 
0.68 (12) 
[0.25 - 0.79] 
90th Percentile MAO3PP 
0.50 (12) 
[0.04 - 0.72] 
0.25 (12) 
[-0.06 - 0.58] 
0.63 (12) 
[0.23 - 0.79] 
 
Before highlighting the relationship between punishment and fairness/altruism, 
we first note the general consistency of these findings. Results from both the UG and 
3PPG show that the greater the punishment in a population, the higher the offers. In the 
3PPG, the MAO3PP (punishment) statistics are all positively correlated with 3PPG 
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offers, with values ranging from 0.52 to 0.68. Similarly in the UG, the MAOUG statistics 
are all positively correlated with mean UG offers, with values ranging from 0.14 to 0.42. 
Consistent with the idea that at least some players are seeking to avoid punishment, the 
80th and 90th percentile statistics are substantially better predictors of offers than the mean 
MAO.  
Using DG as a direct measure of altruism toward anonymous others, Table S8 
shows that all six of our punishment statistics positively correlate with mean DG offers, 
with correlations ranging from 0.13 to 0.57. While all of the 3PPG measures show 95% 
confidence intervals that do not include zero, two of the MAO-UG statistics do slightly 
overlap zero. Since MAO in the UG (second party punishment) may combine both 
motivations for punishing norm violations (in this case equity norms) and motivations for 
revenge, due to a personal monetary loss, there is some reason to anticipate the stronger 
and tighter relationship between third party punishment (MAO in 3PPG) and altruism 
(DG offers). That is, because coevolutionary theories of cooperation are based on 
motivations for punishing norm/equity violation—and not for revenge for personal 
affronts—the additional potential for revenge motivations in the UG complicate the 
linkage between punishment and altruism. Our mean MAO-UG and MAO-3PP are 
correlated 0.55 (CI: 0.33-0.68). Thus, from the perspective of coevolutionary theory, our 
measure of third party punishment is the best measure to relate to DG-altruism.  
 
   
 
 
 
 28 
 
References 
 
S1. J. R. Carter, M. D. Irons, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 171 (1991). 
S2. W. T. Harbaugh, K. Krause, S. G. Liday. (2002). 
S3. M. Sutter, M. Kocher. (Jena, 2003). 
S4. D. L. Bahry, R. K. Wilson, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60, 37 
(2006). 
 
S5. B. S. Frey, S. Meier, Economic Inquiry 41, 448 (2003). 
 
S6. J. Henrich et al. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, 795 (2005). 
 
S7. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, eds. Foundations 
of Human Sociality. Oxford (2004). 
